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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The above-entitled Appeal is from a judgment granted by the Second Judicial District
Court, Weber County, State of Utah, in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee. The court has jurisdiction to
hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellee does not desire to add to the statement of issues which has been set out in
the Appellant's memorandum. However, the Appellee believes the Appellant has incorrectly
stated the standard of review. The ruling by the trial court which constitutes a determination of
law is reviewed non-deferentially for correction, State vs Pena. 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah, 1994).
However, the ruling on an issue of fact must be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). In reviewing the exercise of the court's discretion, it must
be shown that the trial court acted arbitrarily or capricious or its decision was a clear abuse of
discretion, Kunzler vs O'DelL 855 P. 2d 270 (Ut. App. 1993).
The Appellee believes that the Appellant in the statement of the issues has not adequately
distinguished between rulings of law, determination of fact and the application of the court's
power of discretion. These issues will be move fully discussed in the Appellee's argument.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
U.C.A. Section 25-5-1
U.C.A. Section 25-5-4
U.C.A. Section 25-6-2
U.C.A. Section 25-6-5
U.C.A. Section 25-6-6
1

U.C.A. Section 25-6-8
U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(k)
U.C.A. Section 78-25-16
U.C.A. Section 78-27-26
Rule 1002 Ut.R.Evid.
Rule 1004 Ut.R.Evid.
R u l e l l U t R . C.P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.

The Plaintiff/Appellee, Susan White, (White) filed this lawsuit asking the court to
determine that a deed in lieu of foreclosure executed between Western Railroad Builders Defined
Benefit Pension Plan, (Plan) in favor of the Defendant/Appellant, Wyoming and Colorado
Railroad Company, Inc., (WYCO) was void and should be set aside and declared null.
II.

Course of Proceedings.

The Appellee agrees with the statement made by the Appellant in his brief with the
exception of the fact that the Motion in Limine filed by White on June 14, 1993 asked the court
to prohibit the Appellant, its agents or counsel from making any reference to any documents
other than the checks that were produced at the time of the deposition. The court granted White's
Motion in Limine, (R. p. 390).
HI. Disposition in the Court Below.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement and issued
its Memorandum Decision on December 29, 1993 (R. p. 480). Findings of Facts, Conclusions of
2

Law and Judgment were entered on January 21, 1994 (R. p. 486 through 495). The Judgment
declared the trust deed and the deed in lieu of foreclosure as being void and set aside and
declared null said transfer of property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about the 13th of day of February, 1985, David L. Durbano, as Trustee of

Western Railroad Defined Benefit Pension Plan, executed a trust deed and a trust deed note with
Susan White (White) and her then husband Melvin T. Kemp in the sum of $283,290.40 at 10%
interest per annum. Said trust deed was secured by a approximately 60 acres of property located
in the Ogden Valley, Weber County, State of Utah. (Ex. P3)
2.

On July 11, 1986, a Notice of Default on the trust deed was served on Western

Railroad Builders Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, Trustee, (The Plan), by
White. That Notice of Default was the basis for the initiation of two (2) separate lawsuits. One
was entitled Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano.
Trustee, Plaintiff vs Susan H. Kemp aka Susan H. White and John Does 1 through 5 inclusive,
which lawsuit was filed in the Weber County District Court and identified as Civil No. 97872. In
that lawsuit The Plan attempted to prevent White from foreclosing on the trust deed. (Ex. P3)
The other lawsuit that was filed was entitled Susan H. Kemp aka Susan H. White.
Plaintiff vs Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan. David L. Durbano.
Trustee, filed in Weber County, identified as Civil No. 1694-88. That lawsuit was for the
purpose of foreclosing on the real property. On the 11th day of October, 1988, Judge Roth
entered an order which prohibited The Plan from disposing of or encumbering approximately ten
3

(10) acres of the 60 acres which was held in its name. Said order remained in existence until the
15th day of June, 1993, when said lawsuit was dismissed. (Ex. P2)
3.

The lawsuit of Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L.

Durbano Trustee vs Susan H. Kemp aka Susan H. White, was ultimately resolved by the Plan
paying to White a $17,500.00 payment that was delinquent plus $18,472.00 that was owed to an
underlining obligation on the property. Said sums were paid to White on the 22nd day of
December, 1989. That lawsuit also required White to release to the Plan 2.68 acres of additional
land, which land was conveyed to the Plan on or about the 6th day March, 1989, making a total
acreage then possessed by the Plan in the amount of 12.68 acres. (Ex. P3)
4.

After the reinstating of the trust deed and trust deed note, The Plan again became

delinquent in its payments and a trustee's sale was held on the 18th day of May, 1990 at which
the approximately 50 acres of land then secured under the trust deed was purchased by White.
(Ex. p. 4). Thereafter a lawsuit was filed in Weber County by White for a deficiency under the
trust deed note. That lawsuit was entitled Susan White, Plaintiff vs Western Railroad Builder's
Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, Trustee, and identified as Civil No.
900901419. White was granted a judgment in the sum of $86,040.74, plus interest at the rate of
10 per cent from May 18, 1990 to May 8, 1991, in the sum of $8,367.35 and 12 per cent interest
thereafter. Said judgment was entered on June 5, 1991. (Ex. P6)
5.

On the 18th day of May, 1990, Douglas M. Durbano, as the attorney for The Plan,

recorded a trust deed, which was dated the 20th day of December, 1988. The Trustor on said
deed was David L. Durbano, Trustee of The Plan. The Trustee was Douglas M. Durbano,
Attorney at Law and the beneficiary was the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc.
4

(WYCO). Said trust deed stated that it was issued to secure a principle debt in the sum of
$45,972.91. The trust deed included a legal description containing approximately 10 acres of
land and a second legal description containing 2.68 acres of land. (Ex. P4)

The legal

description of the 2.68 acres of land was not created and did not exist until March 6, 1989 at
which time it had been prepared by Great Basin Engineering Inc. at the request of The Plan. (Ex.
P9,T. 22, line 22 -23, line 13)
6.

On the same date that said trust deed was recorded, the 18th day of May, 1990, a

document entitled Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure was also recorded, which deed was signed by
David L. Durbano as the Trustee of The Plan and dated the 18th day of May, 1990. Said deed
purported to transfer the 12.68 acres, which description was attached to the trust deed, in lieu of
foreclosure. (Ex. P8)
7.

The transfer of the 12.68 acres of land from The Plan left said plan insolvent and

without any assets. (T. 233)
8.

After the complaint in this action was filed, White attempted to obtain documents

from the Defendant, WYCO and from David L. Durbano by serving subpoenas, notices of
depositions and by court order. A deposition was held on March 31,1992 at 1:30 p.m. in the
jury room of Judge Ronald O. Hyde, at which time Douglas M. Durbano, David L. Durbano,
Trustee of The Plan, and Phillip D. Scott, President of WYCO were to appear and produce
documents and have their depositions taken. No documents were produced at that time with the
exception of some cashier's checks. As a result of the failure of the Defendant and the other
parties to produce documents, Judge Roth entered an order on the 12th day of June, 1992 that the
Defendant's documents were inadmissible because the Defendant had failed to find or produce
5

the documents during discovery. Judge Roth's order read, in part, as follows:"... with the
exception of cashier's check, which were presented to the Plaintiffs counsel during the course of
the deposition, none of the documents requested by Plaintiff exist and will not exist and will not
be used as evidence . . . as a penalty, the Defendant will not be allowed to use any other
documentary evidence even if discovery between now and the time of the time of the trial." (R.
162, 209)

This case was filed on May 7, 1991. The Defendant attempted to admit a series of

documents at the time of the trial which purportedly established the existence of the transfer or
encumbrance. The trial Judge West found the documents inadmissible.
9.

The deed of trust purported to transfer or encumber The Plan's interest in the real

property to the WYCO.

The trust deed was allegedly executed on December 20, 1988.

However, it contained a legal description that didn't even exist until March 6, 1989. The trust
deed was recorded on May 18, 1990. The trial court found the trust deed was not a credible
documentation of a valid transfer or encumbrance of the 12.68 acres. (T. 480)
10.

White also alleged that the transfer violates the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,

Section 25-6-1, et Seq. U.C.A.

The trial court found that the trust deed was not a valid

encumbrance or transfer, but that if the transfer or encumbrance was valid, the transaction would
be in violation of the Act and subject to avoidance.

The Court was satisfied that the attempted

transfer and encumbrance was in fraud of a creditor, White, and the trust deed and deed of
reconveyance should be voided. (T. 480)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Appellant Has Not Properly Marshalled the Evidence
6

II.

WYCO Failed to Produce the Trust Deed Note and Other
Records and therefore should be Prohibited from Relying
upon said Documents or Testimony Concerning the Same
A.

WYCO Failed to Comply with the Court Order
to Produce Documents

B.

WYCO did not Produce a Copy of the Trust Deed Note
Prior to the Date of Trial

C.

Testimony Pertaining to the Documents that were not
Produced is Precluded by the Parole and Best
Evidence Rule

D.

Testimony Concerning the Note and Consideration
is Barred by the Statute of Frauds

III.

The Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclousure did not Transfer
an Interest in the Real Property to WYCO

IV.

The Plan was Prohibited by a Court Order from Encumbering
the Property in Question

V.

The Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure are in
Violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act

VI.

Counsel for WYCO Incorrectly Represents the Testimony
Presented at the Trial and White should be Awarded
Attorney's Fees

ARGUMENT
I.
The Appellant has not properly marshalled the evidence.
The Utah Appellate Courts have been clear that an Appellant who attacks a finding of fact
made by the trial court, must marshall evidence listing all the evidence supporting the finding
that is challenged. Alta Indust. Ltd. vs Hurst, 846 P. 2d 1282, 1286 (Utah, 1993). Once the
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information is properly marshalled, the Appellant must then demonstrate that the marshalled
evidence is not sufficient to support the trial court's finding of fact, which finding must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Stewart vs Board of Review. 834 P.
2d 134, 138 (UtApp. 1992).
WYCO has not attempted to marshall the evidence which supports the trial court's finding
of fact. An example of this is the statement of WYCO under paragraph la of its argument. The
second sentence of that section states,".. .however the weight of the testimony at trial on this
issue was contrary to the finding of the trial court . . . . " . Counsel for WYCO then cites the
testimony of Douglas M. Durbano, who was the attorney representing WYCO at the trial level,
but fails to cite testimony of four (4) of the individuals who testified otherwise. Those
individuals were White, Appellee; Phil D. Scott, the former President of WYCO; Walter T.
Merrill, counsel for WYCO; and David L. Durbano, an officer of WYCO. The testimony of
these various individuals is referred to in more detail in Point II B of this brief. An examination
of WYCO's brief with demonstrate that it failed to marshall evidence on any of the issues that are
the subject of its appeal. Consequently, this court should assume that the trial court's Findings of
Fact are correct. Alta Indust. Ltd. vs Hurst, Supra.
IL
WYCO failed to produce the trust deed note and other records and therefore should be
prohibited from relying upon said documents or testimony concerning the same.
A.
WYCO failed to comply with the Court order to produce documents.
WYCO was prohibited from introducing any documents or testimony concerning any
8

documents or transactions other than the ones produced at the depositions of Doug Durbano,
David Durbano and Phil Scott. A complaint was filed in this case originally on May 7, 1991.
Thereafter an amended complaint was filed on approximately July 31, 1991. Shortly after the
filing of the complaints, WYCO filed a request for scheduling conference asking that the trial be
expedited. In order to prepare to try the case, White immediately became engaged in discovery.
On October 7, 1991, White served on David Durbano a subpoena duces tecum to produce
documents on October 17, 1991. That subpoena required David Durbano, as the trustee of The
Plan, to produce "any and all financial records of the Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit
Pension Plan, including financial statements, registers, tax records, and all other financial
documents showing any and all assets held by the Defined Benefit Plan from and after January,
1985 to the present time." (R. 137 & 138) On October 11, 1991, White served Douglas Durbano
as the registered agent for WYCO a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to deliver documents
on October 17, 1991. That subpoena required Douglas Durbano to produce the following, "All
of the financial records you have of the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc.,
including but not limited to any and all records you possess showing that any money has been
transferred from the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc., accounts pursuant to a
note and trust deed dated the 22nd day of December, 1988 between David L. Durbano, trustee of
Wyoming Railroad's Defined Benefit Pension Plan and the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad
Company, Inc." (R. 139 - 140) White also noticed up the depositions of David Durbano and
Douglas Durbano to be taken on the 17th day of October, 1991. The day before the depositions,
Douglas Durbano informed the Plaintiff by letter that he would not be showing up for the
depositions. Thereafter, said depositions were scheduled again for January 7, 1992. (R. 116)
9

Again, a day before the scheduled depositions, White was informed that the parties would not
appear. Consequently, White filed a motion for an order compelling discovery and Judge Roth
entered an order on the 26th day of March, 1992 requiring Douglas Durbano, David Durbano and
Phil Scott, President of WYCO, to appear for deposition on March 31, 1992 at 1:30 p.m. The
court also ordering David Durbano and Douglas Durbano to comply with the subpoenas. (R.
131)
The deposition was held on March 31,1992 at 1:30 p.m. in the jury room of Judge Hyde.
At that time, Douglas Durbano, David Durbano and Phil Scott appeared, but did not produce any
documents that had been previously subpoenaed and were not able to inform White of any
documents that were in existence with the exception of copies of checks from Douglas Durbano's
trust account to White and her attorney, Robert A. Echard paid on behalf of The Plan dated
December 22, 1988 in the sum of $35,978.00. (Ex. P10)
WYCO through its attorney, Douglas Durbano, filed a memorandum in opposition to the
motion for sanctions, in which WYCO acknowledged that White was seeking financial records
of The Plan, as well as any financial records WYCO had showing the transfer of any monies to
the pension plan. (R. 144)

At the hearing on White's motion, counsel for WYCO indicated that

the records had not been provided because WYCO did not want to spend the time or money to
locate said records and WYCO felt they were not relevant. Judge Roth responded with a ruling;
"So there shouldn't be much objection to simply going forward with the trial of the case, or
Motions, whatever are necessary, with an Order from this Court that as of this time none of them
exist and will not exist and will not be used as evidence." In response to a question concerning
the presentation of testimony, Judge Roth stated; "Testimony is still evidence. If there is a
10

statute of frauds that applies, something that means you cannot consider oral evidence, we will
have to deal with that. But the documentary evidence as of this point, the law of the case says it
doesn't exist. It is not there." An order to that effect was entered by Judge Roth. (T. 105 - 107)
White filed a Motion in Limine with a supporting memorandum with the court on
approximately June 14, 1993. At the time of the deposition, White was in possession of the trust
deed dated December 20, 1988 and the deed in lieu of foreclosure date the 18th day of May,
1990. (Ex. P7 & P8) Both of those documents had been recorded at the County Recorder's
office. White asked Judge West to prohibit WYCO, its agents and counsel from presenting any
testimony as to any documents other than the checks that were produced at the time of the
deposition; and the trust deed and deed in lieu of foreclosure. Judge West granted that motion
(R. 390 & T. 181 - 182) A penalty has been imposed for the WYCO's failure to respond to
numerous requests for discovery. WYCO has been prohibited from relying upon or presenting
any testimony about any documents with the exception of the cashiers check produced at the
time of the deposition and the trust deed and deed lieu of foreclosure.

The Utah Supreme

Court has ruled that it is appropriate for a trial court to enter such an order. In the case of Hill vs
Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992) the Appellate Court reviewed the decision of the trial
court in limiting testimony to be presented at the time of the trial in response to a Motion in
Limine filed by the defendant. The trial court had prevented the plaintiff from submitting
evidence. In upholding the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals stated,"... it is not an
abusive of discretion for a trial court to refuse to admit "evidence which is not timely provided to
the opposing party contrary to the court's instructions'."
B.
11

WYCO did not produce a copy of the trust deed note prior to the date of trial.
WYCO and its counsel attempted, at the time of the trial, to introduce the document entitled
Trust Deed Note, which was marked as Exhibit PI 1. WYCO contended that a copy of the trust
deed note had been provided to White and her counsel prior to the date of the trial. Judge West
refused to allow the note to be admitted into evidence. (T. 127, 231 - 232)

WYCO contended

that the court's ruling, refusing to admit the note, was a ruling of law. Judge West specifically
addressed that issue and stated that it was a factual determination because WYCO had not
presented any evidence that the documents had been produced to White or her attorney. (T. 129).
WYCO in its brief in point I contends that the trust deed note was delivered to White or
her counsel and that the weight of the testimony at the trial supported that conclusion. In support
of its position, WYCO cites the testimony of Douglas Durbano, who was the attorney
representing WYCO at the time of the trial and the testimony of an associate of Douglas
Durbano, Walter T. Merrill, who is the counsel who wrote the brief for WYCO. In this regard,
the brief states,".. .Douglas Durbano's and Mr. Merrill's unbiased testimony was totally ignored
by the court." (p. 11). WYCO also states,"... However, the evidence at trial that the trust deed
was disclosed far out weighed any evidence to the contrary." (p. 10). Counsel for WYCO has
failed to marshall the evidence concerning this issue.
Douglas Durbano contends that he produced a copy of the note to White's attorney,
Robert A. Echard, at the time of the deposition. (T. 195, line 17 - 24). WYCO's counsel,
Douglas Durbano, called Walter T. Merrill to testify during the course of the trial. Durbano
attempted to get Merrill to state that the trust deed note had been in Durbano's file and must have
been delivered to White's attorney. Judge West would not allow him to draw that conclusion.
12

During that exchange, Merrill testified that he had not personally delivered or caused to be
delivered the trust deed note to White's attonrey, Mr. Echard. (T. 180, line 4-12). In addressing
the issue of whether or not the note was disclosed, Judge West made the following statement,
"You were ordered to disclosed that, Mr. Durbano, and you didn't, and I understand your
frustration. It was never disclosed." (T. 179, line 10-12).
White was called to testify at the trial. She was at the depositions of Douglas Durbano,
David Durbano and Phil Scott. She testified that prior to the date of the trial that she had not
been aware of the trust deed note that was supposedly executed in December, 1988; and that the
trust deed note was not produced at the depositions of Douglas Durbano, David Durbano or Phil
Scott. (T. 46, line 6 - 22). White also testified that during the course of the deposition, her
attorney Robert A. Echard, had requested to look at the file in the possession of David Durbano.
David Durbano responded, "No. You are not looking in my file." (T. 216, line 18 -23).
Phil Scott, who was the President of WYCO at the time the trust deed note and trust deed
were allegedly executed, also testified. He testified that he first became aware of the trust deed
in approximately 1990 and that he had never seen a trust deed note. (T. 62, line 22 through p. 63,
line 6). Phil Scott also testified that he was present at the depositions of David Durbano and
Douglas Durbano, that neither he nor the other individuals had produced any documents at the
time of the deposition other than the two checks from Durbano's trust account, the trust deed and
deed in lieu of foreclosure. He specifically stated that a trust deed note was not produced. (T. 69,
line 18-70, line 20). Later in the trial, David Durbano called Phil Scott to the stand again.
Under cross-examination Phil Scott again stated that the note had not been produced at the
deposition and that he had not previously seen the note. (T. 214, line 6-18). Mr. Scott went on
13

to state, "Well, I might, but I specifically remember the note was not produced that day." (T. 215,
line 5-10). WYCO also called David Durbano concerning the production of the trust deed note.
David Durbano stated that he assumed the note had been delivered to White's attorney during the
course of the depositions, but stated, "I didn't read it. I don't really recall exactly what was
delivered on that date. No." (T. 226, line 13 - 227, line 4).
During the course of the trial the only person who claimed he had knowledged
concerning the delivery of the trust deed was WYCO's attonrey, Douglas Durbano. It seems
clear that Douglas Durbano's testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of all of the other
witnesses that testified at the trial, was not unbiased and his testimony did not out weigh any
evidence to the contrary. The court's ruling that the trust deed note had not been produced was a
determination of fact and consequently should only be overturned if Judge West's ruling was
clearly erroneous. It should be noted that Douglas Durbano was the attorney for The Plan,
WYCO, David Durbano and Phil Scott. (T. 66). Douglas Durbano testified that he received a
copy of the order submitted to Judge Roth for signature and that that order contained a paragraph
which stated,
" It is hereby ordered that based upon the representations of counsel for the defendant,
the courts rules that with the exception of the cashier's checks, which were presented to the
plaintiffs counsel during the course of the deposition, none of the documents requested by the
plaintiff exist, will not exist, and will not be used as evidence."
Douglas Durbano admitted that he did not object to that order. (T. 209, line 6-211, line 14). It
should be noted that Douglas Durbano is the attonrey who prepared the deed in lieu of
foreclosure and recorded the trust deed for the first time on May 18, 1990, the date of White's
trustee's sale. He is also the attorney which admitted that he altered the legal description attached
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to the trust deed to include a description of 2.68 acres that was not in existence on the date the
trust deed was purportedly was created. (T. 22, line 2 2 - 2 3 , line 13, 32)
C.
Testimony pertaining to the documents that were not produced is precluded by the
parole and best evidence rule.
Section 78-25-16 of the Utah Code Annotated and entitled "Parole Evidence of Contents
of Writings - When Admissible", deals with the admissibility of oral evidence concerning
writings. That Section states in part as follows: "There can be no evidence of the contents of the
writing, other than the writing itself, except in the following cases:...". None of the conditions
set forth in sub-paragraph 1 through 5 of that section apply in this case. Consequently the
defendant was prohibited from presenting any oral evidence concerning any such documents that
it now claims are in existence.
Article 10 of the Utah Rules of Evidence deals with the contents of writings, recordings
and photographs. Rule 1002 states "To prove the content of a writing,.. .the original writing . . .
is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of this State or by Statute." Rule 1004 states, "The original is not required, and other
evidence of the contents of a writing,... is admissible if:...". Subparagraphs 1 through 4 then
prescribes conditions under which the original is not required. None of those conditions apply in
this case. Consequently, under the Utah Rules of Evidence, a party may not testify or present
other evidence of a document absent the specific exemptions provided under Rule 1004.
WYCO in point lie of its brief filed before this court, contends that testimony should be
allowed because Rule 1004(1) and Section 78-25-16(1) permits evidence when the originals have
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been lost or destroyed. WYCO wants to equate its refusal or inability to produce the documents
with a determination that the documents were lost or destroyed. There is no evidence that has
been produced by WYCO that the documents were lost or destroyed, and in fact, WYCO's
attempt to introduce the note and other documents at the time of the trial would demonstrate that
the documents were not lost or destroyed. In addition, WYCO certainly acted in bad faith in
failing to produce the documents and conform with the previous subpoenas and court orders.
WYCO also contends that the best evidence rule has no application because of the court's
holding in the case of Roods vs Roods. 645 P. 2d 640, 642 (Utah, 1982). That case involved a
paternity action. The appellant had contended that the mother of the child could not testify as to
the gestation period because of the best evidence rule. The court ruled that the best evidence rule
required that the contents of an available written document be proved by introduction of the
document itself. The court went on to state that the length of the pregnancy was a fact that was
independent of any written document and therefore the best evidence rule did not apply. The
facts and ruling of the court has no application to the issues pending before this court.
Counsel for WYCO in its brief discusses the parole evidence rule. However, counsel
misses the point. The parole evidence rule addresses whether or not testimony can be presented
to explain or vary a written document. The general rule is that parole evidence is admissible to
clarify the meaning of ambiguous provisions in written docuemnts. Judge West allowed WYCO
to present testimony concerning the trust deed and the deed in lieu of foreclosure, however, he
would not allow WYCO to present evidence concerning a trust deed note that had not been
produced prior to the trial or about consideration supporting the trust deed note since
documentary evidence concerning that consideration had not been produced before the trial.
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Counsel for WYCO wants to argue that he is able to prove the existance of a note and prove the
existance of checks and other evidence of consideration in order to explain what counsel
characterizes as an ambiguous meaning of the trust deed. The trust deed was not ambiguous
neither was the deed in lieu of foreclosure. Consequently, the law cited by counsel on the parole
evidence rule is not applicable. Counsel attempts to side step this by saying that the entire
agreement which gave rise to the trust deed was at issue and therefore could be explained by
parole evidence. As discussed in other points herein, Judge West ruled that the best evidence
rule and the statute of frauds prohibited such testimony. The court did not create an ambiguity
into the transactions. The transactions were incomplete because the trust deed and the alleged
trust deed note were not created in December, 1988 in the first place or counsel for WYCO
precluded reference and use of the trust deed note and records of financial transactions because
of its failure to comply with the subpoenas and previous orders of the court.
D.
Testimony concerning the note and consideration is barred by the statute of frauds.
Judge West also ruled that the note which WYCO attempted to introduce and had marked
as Exhibit PI 1, was inadmissible because of the statute of frauds. Section 25-5-1 of the Utah
Code Annotated states in part as follows,
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any matter relating thereto, shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the parties creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing."
Section 25-5-4 states in part as follows:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some
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note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: (1)
Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof
I!

The document which Judge West indicated was not admissible because of the statute of frauds
was the trust deed note marked as Exhibit PI 1 which WYCO was attempting to introduce. That
note is purportedly dated December 20, 1988 and provides that it is to be paid on or before
December 31, 1989. Consequently, it is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof. The document is entitled Trust Deed Note and obviously WYCO wants to claim an
estate or interest in real property be reason of the trust deed note and trust deed. Consequently, it
falls under Section 25-5-1 of the statute of fraud.
WYCO cites the case of Machan Hamshire vs Western Real Estate, 779 P.2d 230, 234
(Ut. App. 1989). However, that case does not give any support or comfort to WYCO. That case
involved a real estate broker who was attempting to collect a commission. A number of
documents consisting of letters and other communication were introduced for the purpose of
establishing the commission contract. The Court of Appeals indicated that the various
documents did not satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. The court concluded that one
or more writings may be considered in attempting to meet the requirements of the statutue of
frauds, but concluded,
" . . . Regardless of whether a memorandum is made up of one or more writings, in order
to satisfy the statute it must contain all the essential terms and provisions of the contract to which
the parties have agreed . . . (memorandum must identify parties, subject matter, and 'set out the
conditions of the transaction with adequate certainty'). Furthermore, 'the memorandum must
show what the contract was and not merely note the fact that some contract was made'....".
The only reference made to the trust deed note in the trust deed is as follows,
"For the purpose of securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
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note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $45,972.91, payable to the order of
beneficiary at the times, and in the matter and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of
any sums expended or advanced by beneficiary to protect the security hereof." (Ex. P7)
Clearly the reference in the trust deed to the trust deed note does not meet the requirements set
forth by the court in the Machan case.

Consequently, testimony concerning the note was clearly

inadmissible since the note itself could not be introduced into evidence by reason of Judge Roth's
previous order. The rulings of Judge Roth and Judge West were clearly in accordance with State
law and should not be overturned by this court.
WYCO in its brief before this court contends that White had admitted the existence of a
note through documents previously filed with the court. The best response to that is the one that
Judge West gave when Douglas Durbano first raised the issue. He stated as follows, "No we
don't, Mr. Durbano, that's disingenuous. The statement says . . . you keep wanting to assume
things the way that you read them. He clearly references that the trust deed and the note are in
question. That's what the lawsuit is about. They have questioned all along the existence of the
note." (T. 184, line 22 - 185, line 4)
POINT III
The trust deed and deed in lieu of foreclosure did not transfer an interest in the real
property to WYCO.
During the course of the trial, Judge West ruled that a trust deed and the deed in lieu of
foreclosure did not transfer an interest in the approximately 12.68 acres of land to WYCO. (T.
123). Counsel for WYCO contends under point three of his memorandum that the trust deed was
sufficient to create a valid encumbrance. However, WYCO's counsel does not cite any law to
support that conclusion.
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It is the position of White, that a trust deed is not valid unless there is some consideration
supporting the issuing of a security interest in the real property. Since a trust deed note did not
exist, there was no consideration for the issuance of the trust deed from The Plan to WYCO and
therefore, the trust deed was not effective in obligating or securing the land in question. Since
the trust deed was not effective, a deed in lieu of foreclosure allegedly given to WYCO because
the Plan failed to honor the trust deed, likewise is invalid. The deed in lieu of foreclosure
specifically refers to the fact that it is being executed because of WYCO's right to foreclosure
against the real property in question.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Bangerter vs Poulton. 663 P. 2d 100 (1983) held
as a matter of law that in order to establish a valid trust deed or mortgage, a legal debt or
obligation with a specific amount owing must exist. In that particular case a promissory note had
inadvertently not been signed. However, an affidavit had been filed with the court indicating that
indebtedness did exist and that affidavit had not been disputed. Consequently, the court ruled
that the evidence before the court was that a debt did exist that supported the trust deed. The
court also ruled that where there was a trust deed which cites the existence of indebtedness, but
did not disclose the terms of payment or the rate of interest, there was no evidence that the trust
deed was in default and therefore, the trust deed could not be foreclosed. In the case of Beehive
Security Company vs Bush, 16 Ut. 2d 328 (Utah, 1965), the Utah Supreme Court held that a note
and mortgage was not binding on a party when it did not result from a valid transaction for which
the party received consideration. The law seems clear in the State of Utah that a obligation on
property is not valid unless it is supported by consideration. WYCO did not present any
evidence before the court that any consideration was given for the trust deed and did not present
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any evidence that the trust deed, if valid, was in default. Consequently, the trust deed and the
deed in lieu of foreclosure was void and did not transfer any property rights to WYCO.
White also contends that the trust deed was not enforceable because it was back dated
and/or otherwise falsified. During the course of the trial, White produced evidence that part of
the description attached to the trust deed describing 2.68 acres of land, which was marked as
Exhibit P9, was created on March 6, 1988 and had not existed prior to that date. (T. 31, line 12 line 25). WYCO's attorney, Douglas Durbano, also stipulated that the 2.68 description was
created on March 6, 1993 and had not existed prior to that date. (T. 32, line 17-33, line 7). The
trust deed however, purports to have been executed on December 20, 1988. WYCO's attorney,
Douglas Durbano, in previous appearances before the court and during the course of the trial
admitted that the 2.68 acres had been added to the legal description after March 6, 1989. (T. 22,
line 2 2 - 2 3 , line 13)

The trust deed was purportedly signed by David Durbano. When David

Durbano's deposition was taken on the 31st day of March, 1992, David Durbano clearly testified
that he did not know if the trust deed had been prepared or executed on the 20th day of
December, 1988; and indicated that it may well have been prepared and signed at a later date.
He testified that a legal description may not have been attached to the trust deed when it was
prepared. He also testified that it was possible that he sign the trust deed on the same date that he
executed the deed in lieu of foreclosure, which was May 18,1990. (Deposition of David
Durbano, p. 24 and 26)

Douglas Durbano, in his deposition, testified that he did not know if he

prepared the trust deed or if he was present when it was signed. He also stated that he did not
know if the trust deed was signed on the date on its face. He stated he did not know when the
description was prepared and did not know if the description was attached to the trust deed when
21

it was prepared. (Douglas Durbano's deposition, p. 12 - p. 15). Phil Scott, the President of
WYCO in 1988, testified in his deposition that he did not know if the trust deed was created on
December 20, 1988. (Phil Scott's deposition, p. 56, line 15 - 20). At the trial, Phil Scott testified
that he saw the trust deed about the time of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, which was in 1990.
(T. 62). Phil Scott also testified that as the President of WYCO he did not make a demand or tell
David L. Durbano, as trustee of The Plan, in writing or verbally that he was going to foreclose
because WYCO had not received any money. ( T. 65, line 13-66, line 2). The trust deed in
question purportedly was signed by David Durbano, as the trustee of The Plan, was recorded by
Douglas Durbano, as the attorney for The Plan and WYCO and purportedly created an interest in
WYCO. However, neither David Durbano, Douglas Durbano or Phil Scott, the President of
WYCO, knows when the trust deed was prepared, when the legal description was prepared, or if
the legal description was attached to the trust deed when it was prepared. Given the fact that it is
obvious that part of the description was not created until March, 1989, it would seem apparent
that the trust deed was not executed in its entirety on the date on its face.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Rasmussen vs Olsen, 583 P.2d 50, 52 (Sup. Ct.
1978) dealt with an altered deed. The defendant had altered the deed by obliterating the
paragraph preserving minerals rights and thereafter recorded the document. The court concluded
that the alteration constituted a forgery and stated, "The recording of a forged deed gives no
notice to the world or to anybody else within it of the contents thereof. Such a deed is void . . .
. " . A similar ruling was reached by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Loseevs Jones. 120
Utah 385, 391 (Utah, 1951). The case is not similar to the one before this court, but in that case,
the Supreme Court stated,"... The court also concluded that the deed to David Jones was void
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for the further reason that it had been altered. No question is raised as to that latter ruling. The
court accordingly agrees that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are the owners of the
property . . . . " . It is clear that the trust deed was altered after its preparation or was not prepared
on the date on which it bears. If it was altered then it is a forgery and it is void. Consequently, a
deed in lieu of foreclosure given in reliance from the trust deed does not transfer an interest in
real property.
POINT IV
The Plan was prohibited by a court order from encumbering the property in question.
On the 11th day of November, 1988 in a lawsuit entitled Susan H. Kemp aka Susan H.
White vs Western Railroad Builders Defined Benefit Pension Plan. David L. Durbano. Trustee,
identified as Civil No. 169-88, Judge Roth entered an order which prohibited The Plan from
disposing of or encumbering approximately 10 acres of land which it held in its name. Those 10
acres are the same 10 acres that make up part of the 12.68 acres which supposedly was
encumbered by a trust deed on December 20, 1988. Said order remained in existence until the
15th day of June, 1993. (Ex. P2)
Since The Plan was under a restraining order at the time the deed was issued, The Plan
did not have the legal capacity to transfer an interest in the property to WYCO by a trust deed. It
is the position of White that the failure of The Plan to seek permission from the court to execute
the trust deed or to seek to be released from the restraining order in order to execute the trust
deed is further evidence of the fact that the trust deed was not executed in December, 1988. The
Plan was represented by attorney Douglas Durbano at the time the court order restraining The
Plan was issued. Douglas Durbano was the attorney for WYCO at that time, as well as Phil
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Scott and David Durbano. It is difficult to believe that had the trust deed been prepared in
December, 1988, that Douglas Durbano would not have remember the restraining order which
had been issued approximately one month before. It seems apparent to White that the restraining
order was not considered because the trust deed, in fact, was not executed until approximately the
time of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, which was in 1990. By that time, the lawsuit in which the
restraining order had been issued had been settled and it did not occur to Douglas Durbano or
David Durbano that the alleged trust deed would have violated the restraining order.

POINT V
The trust deed and deed in lieu of foreclosure are in violation of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act.
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Section 25-6-1, et seq., UCA, became
effective on April 25, 1988, and controlled the transactions which allegedly occurred on
December 20, 1988. Section 25-6-5 of that Act states:
(1)
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made
or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation:
(a)
with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b)
without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or an
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor
were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction; or
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(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should
have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability
to pay as they became due.
Section (2) of 25-6-5 defines when actual intent is proven. Six of the 11 requirements
apply in this particular case, they are as follows:
"2(a) the transfer obligation was to an insider;" An insider is defined under
Section 25-6-2(3)(b). That section states that if the debtor is a corporation, which WYCO was, a
party is an insider if he is a director, an officer or person in control of the debtor. David Durbano
was the trustee of The Plan and a director, an officer and a party in control of the debtor WYCO.
WYCO was owned by a family trust and David Durbano was the trustee of that family trust. (T.
50, line 19 - 24, line 4 - line 13, 247, line 15 - 275, line 8).
"(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer;" David Durbano testified that when the deed in lieu of foreclosure was executed in
1990, The Plan owned the 12.68 acres and could pay any money that might have been due on the
land through the sale of said property. (T. 227, line 1-17))
"(c) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;" As previously
indicated in this brief, White did not know of the trust deed until it was recorded in May, 1990.
"(d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been
sued or threatened with suit;" There was a pending lawsuit against The Plan as of December 22,
1988 and White was anticipating suing The Plan for a deficiency after the trustee's sale on May
18, 1990. Douglas Durbano admitted that he recorded the trust deed and deed in lieu of
foreclosure because he anticipated that a lawsuit for deficiency would be filed against The Plan.
(T. 201, line 17 -202, line 13)
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"(e) The transfer was to establish of all of the debtor's assets;" As previously
indicated in this memorandum, The Plan did not own any asset in 1988 or 1990 other than the
12.68 acres of land.
"(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred;" As previously indicated, The Plan did not own any asset
in 1988 or 1990 except the 12.68 acres of land, which The Plan attempted to deed out to WYCO
by the deed in lieu of foreclosure.
Section 25-6-6 states that:
(1)
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if:
(a)
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at the time; or
(b)

the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.

(2)
A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an
antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
As previously indicated herein, White's claim arose before the alleged execution of the
trust deed and the deed in lieu of foreclosure. There was no evidence produced at the time of the
trial that any consideration was given for the transfer and the debtor was insolvent except for the
12.68 acres. David Durbano was an insider and knew that The Plan had no asset other than the
12.68 acres which it was attempting to transfer.
Section 25-6-8 provides that if there is a transfer in fraud of creditors, the creditors are
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entitled to an avoidance of the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditors' claim. If,
in fact, the trust deed and deed in lieu of foreclosure was a valid transfer of the property to
WYCO, then clearly White is entitled to set aside that transfer because the 12.68 acres was
needed in order to satisfy the deficiency judgment White had against The Plan in excess of
$94,000.00 plus interest. (Ex. P6) The property sold at the trustee's sale for the sum of
$3,000.00 per acre. (Ex. P4) Consequently, the 12.68 acres could not satisfy the judgment
obtained by White against The Plan.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Douglas Durbano knew that a foreclosure sale
was taking place on the date that the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure was recorded.
The Trustee's Sale occurred at 9:00 a.m. on the 18th day of May, 1990. The Trust Deed and
Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure were recorded at 4:58 p.m. on the same date. Douglas Durbano
stated that the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure was filed on the 18th day of May, 1990, because he
anticipated that Susan White would file an action for deficiency. (Deposition of Douglas
Durbano, p. 23 - 24, T. 201, line 17 - 202, line 13). Section 25-6-5(1) states that a transfer is in
fraud of creditors if it is transferred with the intent to defraud a creditor or without receiving a
reasonable equivalent in value and the debtor was engaged in a transaction wherein the
remaining assets were unreasonably small or believed that it would incur debts beyond its ability
to pay. David Durbano testified that the Pension Plan did not have any assets in 1988 or 1990
with the exception of the 10 or 12.68 acres. (T. 233, line 11 - 25) The transfer obviously
eliminated any assets from the Pension Plan.
Section 25-6-6 also provides that the transfer is fraudulent if the debtor made a transfer
without receiving a reasonable value or became insolvent as a result of the transfer.
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Subparagraph (2) of that section provides that it is fraudulent if the transfer is made to an insider
for an antecedent debt and the debtor was insolvent or the insider had reason to believe that the
debtor was insolvent. On the 22nd of December, 1988, moneys were paid to the plaintiff by
money orders through Douglas Durbano. If in fact those moneys came from the defendant
railroad company, then the Trust Deed would had to have been executed on or before the 22nd of
December, 1988, otherwise, the Trust Deed would be for an antecedent debt. Hence the
importance of determining how a Trust Deed could be executed on the 20th day of December,
1988, and contain a description that was not in existence until approximately March of 1989. If
the trust deed was executed after December 22, 1988, it was for an antecedent debt. As
previously discussed, David Durbano was an insider. Consequently, the trust deed should be
declared void.
POINT VI
Counsel for WYCO incorrectly represents the testimony presented at the trial
and White should be awarded attorney's fees.
Throughout the memorandum of WYCO, its counsel has incorrectly represented to the
court what occurs at the trial level. Approximately one-half of the transcript from the trial
involves discussions between counsel and the court. Throughout the trial, Judge West gave
Douglas Durbano an opportunity to present testimony, even though it had been previously
objected to by counsel for White. Judge West reasoned that since this was not a jury trial, the
court could later disregard the testimony. The court indicated that it wanted to give Mr. Durbano
an opportunity to fully present his argument. In paragraph 4 of the Statement of Facts, counsel
for WYCO contends that the evidence supported the fact that The Plan borrowed $45,972.91
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from WYCO. However, counsel does not point out to the court that there was a standing
objection to that testimony. (T. 82, line 24 - 83, line 7) Counsel for WYCO fails to inform the
court that the Judge, after hearing much of this evidence, granted White's counsel's motion to
strike the previous testimony. (T. 116, line 6-9)
In paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts, WYCO alleges that The Plan executed a trust
deed note. This in spite of the fact that counsel for WYCO knows the court did not accept the
trust deed note and ruled that oral testimony was not acceptable to establish the existence of the
note. (T. 105 -107, 231) Counsel for WYCO, in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts, again
indicates that there is no dispute concerning the consideration that The Plan received from
WYCO in exchange for the trust deed note. As previous indicated, that was clearly in dispute.
The court in addressing this issue stated, "But doesn't that beg the question by assuming that
there was, in fact, a transaction? Isn't that what Mr. Echard has been hollering about at all of
these motions, that there wasn't a transaction to begin with in the first place? He hasn't conceded
that there was that transaction." (T. 93, line 10-16) In response to Douglas Durbano's allegation
that money came from WYCO to The Plan, the court stated, "No, that's disputed. That is
disputed. That's the issue I thought I was trying, Mr. Durbano. That is the dispute." (T. 95, line
4-10)
In paragraph 12 of the Statement of Facts, counsel for WYCO contends that The Plan had
a $100,000.00 equity in the property which was subject White's lien. The court did not allow
that testimony to be presented and sustained the objection by White to that testimony. (T. 283,
line 12 - 284, line 7) In paragraph 14 of the Statement of Facts, counsel for WYCO argues that
The Plan defaulted in its payment to WYCO and therefore a deed in lieu foreclosure was issued.
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Again this statement assumed that evidence was presented at the trial level, that there was a debt
owed to WYCO. As previously pointed out, no such testimony was admitted by the court.
In paragraph 16 of the Statement of Facts, counsel for WYCO alleges that the trust deed
note was given to opposing counsel at the deposition of David L. Durbano. As discussed
elsewhere in this brief, the only testimony to at effect was from Douglas Durbano, counsel for
WYCO. The same is true for the allegations set forth in paragraph 19 of the Statement of Facts.
In paragraph 20 of the Statement of Facts, counsel for WYCO contends that the existence of the
trust deed note was admitted. In response to this, the court ruled that Mr. Douglas Durbano's
allegation in this regard was disingenuous. (T. 184, line 22 -185, line 4)
Throughout the brief of WYCO similar misrepresentations are made concerning the
evidence that was presented during the course of this trial. It is the position of White that the
misrepresentations are so blatant that the court should consider awarding White attorney's fees
incurred on this appeal. Rule 11 requires that when an attorney signs a pleading or document,
that he certifies that the document is grounded in fact and is not imposed for improper purposes
or to harass and delay. Section 78-27-26 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that attorney's
fees can be awarded when an action is maintained without merit and not brought in good faith. It
is White's position that the misrepresentations and inappropriate allegations of fact throughout of
the brief of WYCO would clearly justify the court in awarding White her attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
WYCO failed to produce to White any documents other than two checks from the
pension plan's trust account to White and a trust deed and deed in lieu of foreclosure.
Consequently, Judge Roth ruled that any other documents did not exist. WYCO did not produce
a trust deed note or any evidence that any money was paid from WYCO to The Plan for the trust
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deed and deed in lieu of foreclosure. WYCO was prohibited from presenting any oral testimony
to establish the trust deed note or that any assets has passed from WYCO to The Plan.
No consideration was given for the trust deed and no demand was made upon The Plan
by WYCO for a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Consequently, neither the trust deed nor the deed in
lieu of foreclosure transferred any interest in real property to WYCO. Therefore, the ownership
of 12.68 acres remained in The Plan and was subject to White's deficiency judgment against The
Plan. Even if a trust deed created an encumbrance upon the 12.68 acres in favor of WYCO, the
trust deed's validity was in question because it contained a description of 2.68 acres that was not
created or in existence until two to three months after the trust deed was supposedly created. In
addition, none of the parties who supposedly would have had knowledge about the creation of
the trust deed were able to testify that the trust deed in fact was prepared on the date it bore, or
that it contained any legal description as of that date. The trust deed was first recorded on the
same date as the deed in lieu of foreclosure, which was on the date that the remaining property
held by The Plan, approximately 50 acres, had been foreclosed at the trustee's sale by White and
WYCO was anticipating a lawsuit being filed by White for a deficiency judgment.
Even if the trust deed and deed in lieu of foreclosure created an interest in the land to
WYCO, that transfer was in fraud of creditors and therefore was void. Since the trust deed was
altered by the 2.68 acres being added after its purported creation, the trust deed was a forgery and
therefore was also voided.
Counsel for WYCO improperly and incorrectly alleged that the court made factual
determination and ruled on evidence that, in fact, the court did not do. Because of WYCO's
counsel's inappropriate conduct in this appeal, White should be awarded attonrey's fees under
Rule 11 and Section 78-27-26 of the Utah Code Annotated.
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